Book Review: D-Day (2009) A. Beevor

Antony Beevor’s D-Day: The Battle for Normandy (2009) provides readers with a narrative of the major events from the beach invasions to the Liberation of Paris during the Allies’ invasion of France in 1944. In addition, the author extensively details the wartime experiences of individuals, adding depth to the understanding of his overarching account. A significant claim made in the book is that the scale of fighting on the western front during 1944 was especially large, and comparable to the blood-drenched battles in the east in its brutality. The British historian is able to support his claim through an illustration of the sheer magnitude of the Allies’ attacks and defense against a fury of Nazi opposition. Further demonstrating the viciousness of the battlefields of France, he shows that morality and fair-fighting were often absent in an example of all-out war at its most horrific.

            Beevor’s assertion that the western front of the Second World War saw a similar amount of killing and destruction during 1944 as the battlefields of the east seems hard to accept when looked at superficially. Historian Norman Davies notes that the Battle of Stalingrad (1942-1943) and Kursk (1943) were responsible for 973,000 and 325,000 deaths respectively (Davies, 25). Death totals as a result of Operation Overlord do not reach either one of these figures. However, Beevor’s judgment of the deadliness of battles of the Second World War is anything but uninformed. Also an established expert on the eastern front, Antony Beevor authored the 1999 publication, Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege. It is not reasonable to attribute the author’s national pride as a reason for making this claim. Throughout D-Day: The Battle for Normandy the British author’s portrayal of his home country is rather unimpressive. British participation in France is marked with occasional poor execution and questionable military leadership, especially General Montgomery who Beevor depicts as a raving egomaniac with no shortage of flaws.

            Perhaps the greatest difference from battles on the eastern front dealt with the geography of France. Unlike the Soviet Union, France is not a vast expanse of land; any opposition that the Allies faced was significantly more concentrated than the wide-open battlefields of the east. The Allied invasion had to be precisely calculated, and it was executed by combining the greatest concentration of manpower by air and sea ever. In the middle of the night just minutes before 6 June 1944, more than 1,200 aircraft dropped three divisions of British and American soldiers on the shore of Normandy (Beevor, 51). This was accompanied by an even more grand display a few hours later. The roughly 5,000 ships carrying about 100,000 men were backed by hundreds more naval warships (74-75). This invasion, unmatched in its scale, undoubtedly produced immense carnage.

            The airborne invasion ultimately was a success, but it was not without deadly costs. Beevor details the chaotic experiences of these men during the invasion by describing: troops crashing to the earth in flimsy gliders, men being dropped into fire, the common occurrence of bones snapping, and infliction of paralysis (Beevor, 52, 63). Perhaps even more nightmarish were the experiences of troops on the beaches where amphibious invasions took place. Troops at Omaha Beach witnessed their bombers missing targets, many men came under direct machine-gun fire upon setting foot on land; some were gunned down on their ships (91, 105). The brutality of combat did not relent once the Allies had all of their men on shore. Beevor notes that numerous atrocities occurred almost immediately. An early experience described tells of a dead American soldier who was mutilated and sexually humiliated; this inspired a number of American soldiers to mercilessly kill any German soldiers, regardless of their willingness to surrender (68). One American soldier spent time cutting ears off of dead Germans, making himself a macabre necklace from his collection; both sides engaged in bayonet practice, impaling wounded enemies (68-70). After the first day of the invasion about 1,200 Germans and over 1,400 Americans were dead (112). These figures do not even account for the British, Scots, Canadians, Norwegians, and Poles that took part in the beach invasions.

            As previously mentioned, the geography of France contributed greatly to viciousness of war in the west. Adding to immense concentrations of military power pitted against each other in a small geographic area, was the challenges presented by the terrain. Just inland from Normandy’s coast was the bocage, a forested area filled with natural barriers to the Allies’ advancement (Beevor, 157). The landscape was treacherous enough for tanks to disappear into hedgerows, and it became rather common for both the Allies and Nazis to find themselves surrounded by the enemy in battle. Bocage fighting was largely a stalemate, and both sides became steeped in bloody attrition warfare. Atrocities were just as pervasive in bocage fighting as much as the beach warfare. Both Canadian and German divisions were guilty of shooting prisoners of war in cold blood (180). Beevor relates more morbid accounts of souvenir-hunting that Americans and Germans engaged in among their dead enemies (214). Additionally, some Americans became victims of a gruesome and deadly surprise when exploding mines were placed within the corpses of their countrymen (286).

    

            The enormity of the losses that both sides experienced in Normandy is noted by drawing a comparison to the eastern front. He states that roughly 2,300 Germans and 2,000 Allied troops were being killed in each month that the battle raged in Normandy; this is compared to the 1,000 Germans and 1,500 Soviets who perishing each month on the eastern front (Beevor, 113). This is an illustration that the Allies preferred swiftness in their defeat of the Nazis, whereas the Soviets valued perseverance. There is also evidence that there were defining moments on the western front which stand alongside the largest-scale battles in history. When the British delayed in launching Operation Epsom they were faced with “the greatest concentration of SS Panzer Divisions which had been assembled since the Battle of Kursk” at Caen (234). While there were more deaths at Kursk, France’s geography needs to be taken into consideration again. The battlefields of the East were far more wide-open. With the author’s penchant for soldiers of democratic states aside, he notes that even some Red Army officers estimate as much as sixty percent of Soviet soldiers never fired a rifle in battle (205). This can be an argument that they were weaker trained and less motivated than the Allies, but it may also speak to the fact that they were not in the midst of the concentration of military power per square mile as large as in Normandy.

            The author shows that the Allies were not content in prolonging the bloody deadlock that characterized bocage fighting. Therefore, drastic means needed to be taken. The British-crafted Operation Goodwood and the Americans’ Operation Cobra are two examples illustrating the Allies’ willingness to speed up victory by unleashing an assault unparalleled in fury. The frustration of a stalemate in Caen, along with their costly experience of delaying a major assault through Epsom, motivated the British to launch Operation Goodwood. The author characterizes it as “the largest concentration of air power in support of a ground operation ever known” (Beevor, 314). The 2,600 bombers assaulted an area that was roughly just 7,000 yards long, which literally caused earthquakes so horrifying that some Germans killed themselves in a deafened and frenetic state. However, the response of the SS Panzer Corps was nothing short of legendary. Although outnumbered, the superior German craft engaged the British in a gruesome stalemate involving hundreds of tanks (319). Beevor notes that over 5,550 British and Canadians lost their lives over the span of just three days during Goodwood (322).

            While Goodwood is perceived as a failure by the author, it arguably contributed significantly to an American follow-up assault which effectively provided the breakthrough necessary to advance towards Paris and damage German morale. Perhaps the fight during Goodwood kept the strong Panzer Corps occupied and effectively wore down German rage, allowing for American success during Operation Cobra. Cobra employed similar tactics of Goodwood. Heavy bombing was notably accompanied by George Patton’s “Hell on Wheels” division, possessed by a desire to achieve victory they embodied the spirit which the Allies continued to fight, while the Germans’ morale waned (351). An observer described the site of the breakthrough at St. Lo as an “area [where] raw meat was splattered on burned and ruined vehicles;” swamps were littered with dead Germans (363-364).   Beevor’s account shows this pattern of events continuing until the Allies reach Paris and General Choltitz is forced to surrender. The uprising of the French and the totally overpowering Allied assault in the Falaise Pocket—involving British, Americans, and their cooperating nations—contributed to the slaughter of German troops in the tens of thousands (Beevor, 478). It was the massive Allied assaults and multi-nation cooperation during the Battle for Normandy which prevented the campaign from becoming an ongoing battle of attrition similar to fighting in the east (518). In conclusion, the battle should be remembered as one of the most horrifically bloody examples of human loss in warfare. It must be realized that the staggering casualty totals Beevor provides in his aftermath—240,000 Germans and 209,000 Allies—happened within the short time period of June through August in the summer of 1944 (522). This is certainly a convincing testament to the battle’s bloody legacy.                

Works Cited

Beevor, Antony. D-Day: The Battle for Normandy. New York: Penguin Books Ltd. 2009, 591 pages.

Davies, Norman. No Simple Victory: World War II in Europe. New York: Penguin Books, Inc. 2006, 544 pages.

Chicago's Murder Castle

Book Review: The Atlantic Slave Trade (1999) H. Klein

                

Klein, Herbert.  The Atlantic Slave Trade. New York: Cambridge  University Press, 1999.

               In his 1999 book, The Atlantic Slave Trade, historian Herbert Klein gives readers an account of the history and workings of the slave trade that sent tremendous numbers of native Africans to the Western Hemisphere as property. In his writing, Klein attempts to de-mythologize a number of aspects surrounding the Atlantic slave trade. He feels the need to transform preconceived notions surrounding the subject that many have derived from popular culture; he presents seldom discussed facts along with heavy amounts of statistical data that are used to counter some of these popular notions. In many ways Klein’s account is enlightening, but in some cases his understatement of horrible experiences, such as the Middle Passage, tends to diminish the unmistakable brutality that slaves endured.

                One aspect of Klein’s writing that is particularly thought provoking is his assertion that Africans were not sought out for slave labor solely because of their race. Rather, it was the market conditions of the new world and the immense demand for labor there, more than anything else, which fueled the demand for slaves (Klein 18). Slaves were a significant part of a new ever-increasing global economy. Klein shows that there was a demand for Asian, American, and European goods in Africa, and slaves—although the practice would become notoriously significant later in history—were just one of the exports that Africa produced in order to get what they needed from the Europeans who regularly traversed the oceans. In many cases the Europeans had what the Africans needed, and in return, Europeans needed a massive amount of cheap labor which was provided to them by the Africans in the form of slaves. In this illustration Klein shows that Europeans obtained slaves from Africa for the sake of convenience and not solely based in the belief of racial superiority. This dispels a common assumption among many today, mainly Americans, who think this way because over time slavery did become an overtly racist practice; while the practice was seen in most of the world as archaic and barbaric it was practiced in America through the justification of the idea that Africans were lesser people.

    

    Additionally, there exists the idea that it was white Western Europeans who ruthlessly tore men, women, and children from their homeland and enslaved them. Klein illustrates that this notion is also mythical. In fact, he clarifies how Africans truly were enslaved as well as providing examples of numbers of ethnic groups that looked to Africa as a resource for slaves. In the first chapter of his book Klein states that slavery’s presence in the continent of Africa dates back to the beginning of recorded times (7). In addition to the prevalence of Africans having African slaves, Klein tells how the Islamic World engaged in the African slave trade through caravan routes a considerable amount of time prior to Europe’s involvement in the Atlantic slave trade (7-9). Although considerably later in time, another instance which discredits the idea that African slaves were used exclusively by white Western Europeans is the strong demand for slave labor called for by people of mixed European and Native American decent in Latin America.

                Klein further reveals lesser known facts in his book. Europeans, who have been demonized in modern times for practicing slavery, were purchasing slaves sold to them by Africans (103). It is because slavery had seemingly existed forever that it was not seen as detestable by Europeans or Africans. As one of the main points Klein’s book makes, the slave trade was not a matter of morality in its day but it first and foremost, it was an economic reality. As Europeans began to colonize the New World and Plantation Economies began to spring up, the demand for slave labor would skyrocket. This will be very beneficial to both colonists as well as African slave merchants. Free labor allowed colonists to make sizable profits on goods coming from the New World, while the high demand for slaves allowed Africans to get the prices and goods they wanted in exchange for them. It is not until the 19^th Century that the view of the practice slavery becomes something immoral, as a prevailing belief among Europeans. It was during this time that Britain, the United States, and eventually all European nations would end the practice of importing slaves from Africa. Klein points out that this would eventually lead to major social and economic problems for the people of Africa. After the exporting of slaves had dried up the continent had fairly insignificant amounts of other resources demanded by the former slave buyers. Furthermore, the termination of the slave trade meant a large supply of slaves within Africa at low prices, causing a dramatic increase in the practice of slavery on the continent of Africa. Klein concludes his narrative on how the slave trade affected Africa by saying: “Thus the end of the Atlantic slave trade did not bring an end to enslavement within Africa” (129).

               

                The problems presented by the end of the slave trade and the less well-known economic and social aspects of slavery contribute to the unique and unconventional picture that Klein paints, and his readers can take much away from this. However, if there is any feature of his writing that is questionable it is the depiction that he provides of the Middle Passage. Even by Klein’s understated account it seems considerably brutal when the reality of it is taken into full consideration. Klein argues that there are two reasons to see the Middle Passage as much less brutal as literature and popular culture have led many to believe. The first is the fact that significantly fewer slaves died on ships than the much higher mortality rates of slaves dying in struggles shortly after being enslaved on their way to the coast (130). The second is the popular culture image of “tight packing” on the ships. Klein says that the notion that slave ships were so tightly packed that they could just barely float is absurd; rather, he rationalizes that slaves were not packed too tightly because shipmen wanted fast ships to get to and from Africa as quick as possible (131-32). It was of no benefit to bring back dead slaves, so Klein contends that slaves were transported as quickly as possible and the intent was to bring them back alive.

                Herbert Klein brings raises some valid points in this respect to the Middle Passage. However, the reality is that the journey would have had to be horrifying and also the death rates were much higher than in passenger ships and even in ships that transported prisoners. Klein compares some death rate figures of convicts who were taken to Australia on ship to the death rates of slaves who were crossing the Atlantic. Bearing in mind, Europe to Australia was a much longer and treacherous voyage than was Africa to the other side of the Atlantic. The figures of convict deaths on their way to Australia were at about 4% around the time of the turn of the 19^th Century; they would go down to under 1% just a few decades later. Also at the turn of the century, slaves crossing the Atlantic were perishing at a rate just under 9% (although over 14% died on Spanish ships); however, unlike the Australia-bound prisoners the overall death rate of slaves would increase over the next few decades to over 11% (134-35, 139). The conclusion that one can draw from this data is that the well-being of slaves was less considered than that of criminals of the day.

                Those figures were in the final years of the Atlantic slave trade. Death rates in the slave trade’s heyday were much greater; near the turn of the 17^th Century slaves died at a rate just under 30% on Spanish ships. Before the English government mandated that slaves be given at least 8 square feet on their ships, the average amount of room allowed to a slave on an English ship was 6 to 7 feet; slaves on the deck of the French ship La Vigilante had 5.6 square feet (133). This is almost unfathomable in today’s world. A full-size mattress, which is the smallest one made for two people, is over 30 square feet. If slaves were able to lie down on board, a conservative estimate would be to say they were as comfortable as five adults on a full-size mattress. The deaths that did occur must have been violent and horrifying as well. Klein identifies disease, rebellion, suicide, and natural disasters as main killers aboard slave ships (159). It is hard to imagine there being an efficient system to dispose of wastes as well. In addition to the prevalence of illness, slaves probably had to sit in the filth of the urine and defecation of the numerous people on board, and it wouldn’t be entirely unimaginable to spend a night next to a corpse either, unless inventory of living and dead was routinely checked throughout the day. When the complete reality of the Middle Passage is considered Klein’s depiction of it is rather soft. Overall, Klein offers a new and thought provoking view of the Atlantic slave trade, and does the job of an effective historian by getting his readers to see things in a new light by challenging assertions and supporting his claims with a great deal of evidence.